The Hushed Case Against a Supreme Court Appointment: Judge Parker\u27s  New South  Constitutional Jurisprudence, 1925-1933 by Fish, Peter G.
12 D U K E L A W MAG A Z 1 N E 
The Hushed Case Against 
a Supretne Court Appointtnent: 
Judge Parker's "New South" Constitutional Jurisprudence, 1925-1933 
Peter G. Fish 
Professor of Political Science and Law. Duke University. Professor Fish, who has 
taught at Duke since 1969, served as a lay member of the United States Circuit 
Judge Nomination Commission, Panel for the Fourth Circuit (1977-79). At the Law 
School, he has taught a seminar on the politics of judicial adminstration and a 
research tutorial on the development of the United States Courts of the Fourth 
Circuit: 1789-1958. This article is a section of a larger work, Fish, Torchbearer 
for Pre-New Deal Southern Economic Development: Judge John J. Parker of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in AN UNCERTAIN TRADITION: 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 253 (K Hall & J. Ely, 
Jr. eds. 1989), a portion of which was published as Fish, Judge Parker and the 
Public Service State, DUKE L. MAG., Summer 1985, at 37. 
H e was hailed as an exponent of the "New South" when nominated in 1930 by President Herbert Hoover for Associate Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court.! But Judge John]. Parker of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit soon found 
himself politically marooned between the Scylla of alleged 
racism and the Charybdis of a reputed anti-labor predisposi-
tion.2 In a Senate confirmation process run amuck, Parker's 
judicial record compiled after his appointment to the appel-
late bench in late 1925 received little attention-with the 
exception of United Mine Workers of America v. Red Jacket 
Comolidated Coal and Coke CO.3 wherein lay putative evi-
dence of his anti-labor proclivities. From that single case 
and from his 1920 North Carolina gubernatorial campaign 
speeches, critics transmogrified the jurist; he personified al-
ternatively the consummate nullifier of the legal rights of 
blacks and labor and the defender of white supremacy and 
private properry.4 
Yet Parker on the bench proved no zealous proponent of 
either racism or private property, although few cases involv-
ing black Americans reached the circuit court in the 1920s 
and early 1930s. Instead, the judge, then in his forties, de-
veloped and expounded an authentic "New South" consti-
tutional jurisprudence which implicitly nurtured the eco-
nomic conditions necessary for southern growth. 5lt was a 
jurisprudence which might well have given pause to some of 
his confirmation opponents who hailed from rival sections 
of the nation. Their apprehensions, if they existed, re-
mained unarticulated. Instead, they attacked the Supreme 
Court nominee on more politically efficacious grounds. 
As an appellate court judge, Parker was no advocate of 
economic laissez-faire. Rather, he labored to unleash state 
police power as a vehicle for realizing economic develop-
ment in the southern states, a topic previously considered in 
the Duke Law Magazine. 6 Nor did he, unlike southern tra-
ditionalists, perceive of local or even regional economic de-
velopment as a means of protecting white supremacy from 
erosion by broad nationalistic tides responsive to national 
economic and political integration.? Such regional chauvin-
ists regarded national regulation of economic life as a pre-
cursor to centralized control of race relations in the South. 
They and their predecessors railed against federal judges and 
federal courts seen as diabolical instruments of northern 
Judge John J. Parker following his ap-
pointment in 1925 by President Calvin 
Coolidge to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit shown 
holding a cane, a gift from Amos M. Stack, 
his former law partner in Monroe, NC. 
economic and political ex-
ploitation of the South.s 
Parker stood apart from 
these sometimes deafening 
and demagogic critics of 
the national judiciary. He 
was an ardent judicial na-
tionalist, but one with a 
pronounced regional bias,9 
especially on matters relat-
ing to southern economic 
life. 
Balancing Law and Policy 
Cases which pitted na-
tional interests against 
southern regional interests 
tested Parker's fidelity to 
the tenets of judicial 
nationalism. Activism on 
the part of the federal gov-
ernment could promote 
development of an eco-
nomically viable"New 
South." On the other 
hand, Hamiltonian initia-
tives from Washington 
could have the opposite 
effect. 10 How to temper 
national policies injurious 
to regional growth per-
plexed Parker in cases in-
volving national banking, electric power and railroad freight 
rate policies. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. Parker as lawyer 
had represented southern country banks then warring 
against the Federal Reserve's "par clearance" system. In the 
United States Supreme Court he had defeated the central 
bank's attempt to establish a national clearinghouse 
system whereby onerous exchange charges were imposed 
on checks tendered at Reserve Bank counters by country 
banks. I I Once on the bench, Parker implicitly questioned 
the Reserve system's centralizing tendencies as a develop-
ment antithetical to southern interests. Yet, he proved 
unable to curb the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. 
"I have been sweating for a week over the opinion" in 
Federal Reserve Bank v. Early, he wrote. Afrer reading" all 
of the cases cited and a great many others and ... looking at 
the case from every angle," he acknowledged that the 
national clearinghouse's claim to the deposit balance of 
one of South Carolina's numerous insolvent banking 
institutions seemed unassailable. "I started out to write an 
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opinion on the other side of the proposition," he con-
fessed, "but I found that it would not write that way."12 
A disappointed Parker held that "the deposit balance in 
favor of the insolvent bank should be applied to checks as 
the Federal Reserve Bank contends."13 The decision effec-
tively accorded a preferential claim on deposit reserves of 
failed banks to remote users of the Federal Reserve clearing-
house system over claims of local depositors and other credi-
tors of such insolvent financial institutions. 
Southern Utilities. Parker had previously affirmed the 
exercise of governmental power as against the right of pri-
vate property asserted by timber owners in a case wherein 
national and regional interests in developing Great Smoky 
Mountains National Park had been complementary. 14 Fed-
eral condemnation of the Duke-owned Southern Power 
Company's right-of-way across Nantahala National Forest, 
however, encouraged close scrutiny of this interference with 
the keystone of the region's economic infrastructure. As the 
utility's brief stressed, the electric power generated by the 
company went out "to cities and towns, cotton mills, and 
other industrial enterprises, and to the public generally," 
and the transmission lines in question also "constitute[dl the 
sole connecting link between the system of the defendant 
and that of the Georgia Railway & Power Company and ... 
the system of other power companies lying to the south of 
the defendant's system." To sever vital connections between 
power grids in the region would cause irreparable loss to the 
public. IS 
Parker agreed with counsel's assessment. The land in 
question had been obtained for laudable conservation pur-
poses which hardly suffered from rights-of-way enjoyed by 
public utilities. But interference with their lines would cer-
tainly "involve inconvenience with loss to the public and 
needless expense to the government."16 Furthermore, Con-
gress had never intended to endow the Department of Agri-
culture with power "to condemn the rights-of-way of rail-
way and power companies for forestry purposes merely be-
cause they happen to be situated on forest lands acquired by 
the government."I? 
Intrastate Freight Rates. Freight rates established by 
the Interstate Commerce Commission had far-reaching im-
plications for southern life. The Lee-fixed rates consti-
tuted a national internal tariff system perceived as respon-
sible for perpetuating the South's colonial economy and 
He was an ardent judicial nationalist} 
but one with a pronounced regional 
bias} espeCially on matters relating to 
southern economic life. 
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How to temper national policies injurious 
to regional growth perplexed Parker in 
cases involving national banking, electric 
power and railroad freight rate policies. 
subordinating it to the economic hegemony of the northern 
metropole. 18 
To be sure, Parker affirmed exercises of Congress' power 
to regulate interstate commerce in order to protect that 
commerce from harmful consequences flowing from 
intrastate activities. 19 But like Chief Justice William Howard 
Taft, he saw a clear distinction between freight shipped in 
intrastate commerce and that carried in interstate com-
merce.20 The distinction became significant for local con-
sumers, shippers, and producers because classification of 
commerce as intrastate meant subjecting goods used within 
the several states to rates set by state agencies at levels often 
below those authorized by the Le.e.21 In an opinion which 
Parker deemed among his "most important," he rejected a 
regional rail carrier's contention that petroleum shipped in-
terstate by sea to a tank storage depot at the port of 
Wilmington and thereafter distributed in railroad tank cars 
to some 20,000 Tar Heel customer constituted "continuous 
shipments in interstate commerce. "22 Instead, he held in 
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad and Seaboard Air Line Railway 
Co. v. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey that at 
Wilmington the oil and gasoline "came to rest and lost their 
identity in complainant's storage tanks and were mingled 
with its general stock."23 Consequently, shipments from the 
North Carolina port constituted "independent movements" 
within the meaning of a Brandeis-coined Supreme Court 
test. The applicable rates became those approved by the 
North Carolina Corporation Commission for intrastate 
shipments rather than the higher Le.e.-fixed interstate 
rates.24 Le.e. rates and orders encountered similar judicial 
hostility in another case, but several which portended either 
lower costs or enhanced intra-regional competition or both 
were approved.25 
At the critical decisional points where federal judges en-
joyed discretion, Parker's regional proclivities surfaced. 
His decision-making approach involved the parsing of often 
complex facts of cases wherein national power was arrayed 
against southern regional interests in economic viability. 
That same approach also manifested reasoned exposition of 
statutes and constitutional doctrines, and a pragmatic, if 
usually implicit, policy determination compatible with the 
tenets of the "New South" creed. It was an approach which 
suffused judicial resolution of conflicts involving the south-
ern bituminous coal industry. 
Southern Coal Industry 
On no other subject did the Fourth Circuit confront 
greater national-regional tensions than in cases which related 
to the labor intensive bituminous coal industry of the south-
ern Appalachians. And, in no other area did a policy-based 
pro-South jurisprudence so strikingly emerge during the 
decade before the New Deal than it did in defense of the 
threatened coal industry. At stake were that industry's trans-
portation costs regulated by the Le.e.; its labor costs de-
pendent on avoidance of high uniform and nationwide 
union wage scales; and its price-fixing powers. Favorable 
resolution of these three key issues meant apparent preserva-
tion of regionally important mining enterprises. To the fed-
eral court in the 1920s came southern coal operators to re-
late doleful tales of their bare survival, tales which became 
the focus of the court's attention. 
The trial and appellate judges in the circuit heard about 
intersectional economic strife that soared to new heights in 
the Harding-Coolidge era. Coal shortages and escalating 
prices during World War I had induced a boom in bitumi-
nous coal and related development of new mines in the 
southern Appalachians. With demobilization and enhanced 
competition from petroleum and natural gas, the coal in-
dustry confronted vast surplus capacity, an inelastic demand 
for its product, and slipping prices and profits.26 Operator 
survival in this laissez-faire jungle meant cuts in either or 
both key factors which determined coal costs to the con-
sumer: transportation and labor. 
Lake Cargo Coal Case. Anchor Coal Co. v. United States 
called into question Le.e.-6xed coal freight rates and the 
consequences for the region's economy of such nationally 
established charges.27 The suit by southern operators to en-
join rates on their coal shipped into the lucrative Great 
Lakes industrial market reflected acute intra-industry and 
intersectional rivalry for dominance in "Lake Cargo Coal." 
Northern operators in the Central Competitive Field 
stretching from western Pennsylvania into Illinois enjoyed a 
natural advantage in their geographical proximity to 
industrial markets, an advantage offset by prevailing union 
wage scales which raised their production costs to levels ex-
ceeding those of the southern operators.28 
Intoads made by southern bituminous in Great Lakes 
markets evoked protests ftom northern operators and action 
by the Le.e. At issue were the "Lake Cargo Coal" rates 
charged by railroads. Rates on a per ton basis from nearby 
northern 6elds ranged below those charged remote produc-
ers in southern West Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee. 
Higher total transportation costs, even if much lower per 
mile, required that southern operators achieve the smallest 
possible per ton rate differential ftom mine to market. Be-
tween mid-I922 and mid-I92? the differential between the 
benchmark Pittsburgh and Kanawha rates stood at twenty-
As an isolated and low wage labor mar-
ket, the South enjoyed a competitive edge 
in common markets against products 
from regions with higher labor costs 
and/or more capital intensive industries. 
five cents. But in August 1927 the northern carriers, with 
Lee permission, reduced their rates by twenty cents, 
thereby increasing the differential to forty-five cents. South-
ern railroads retaliated. They lowered their rates by the 
same amount and restored the former twenty-five cent dif-
ferential. Appeals for protection by the northern carriers 
won an Lee order directing their sectional competitors to 
suspend the unauthorized twenty cent rate reduction and to 
justifY its reinstatement.29 
When their justification failed to satisfy the commission, 
southern coalmen, led by Wall Street lawyer John W. Davis, 
went into the United States Court for the Southern District 
of West Virginia to enjoin enforcement of the agency's rate 
suspension order and justification requirement. 3D Three days 
of what Parker termed a "strenuous hearing" was followed 
in March 1928 by his selection as author of the three-judge 
district court's opinion.31 The Lake Cargo Coal Rate opinion 
reflected his conviction that the Lee's rate suspension or-
der presented "a question fraught ... with the gravest conse-
quences to the future of the country, if the power asserted ... 
can be sustained." Answering this question required an ac-
tivist approach. It would be necessary, he stated at the out-
set, "to look behind" the Lee's conclusions on the rea-
sonability of rates "and ascertain exactly what it is that it has 
done, and upon what facts and upon the application of 
what principles it has arrived at its conclusion. "32 What the 
agency had done seemed self-evident to resident District 
Judge George W. McClintic. It had played sectional favor-
ites, affording "a 'special providence' for the Ohio and Pitts-
burgh coal operators, rather than thinking of the consumers 
in the north-western states or the southern carriers or coal 
operators. "33 
The immediate question before the court involved statu-
tory construction. Had Congress empowered the agency to 
make national economic policies? Quoting voluminously 
from commission reports reciting the collapsed state of the 
beleaguered bituminous industry in the North, Parker 
thought it 
perfectly evident ... that, in reducing the rates from the 
northern field, and in directing the cancellation of the 
reduction from the southern field, the Commission 
was primarily concerned, not in fixing rates, but in 
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fixing the differential which was to prevail between the 
two fields and that the Commission based its action 
upon the shift of tonnage from the northern to the 
southern field and the industrial conditions resulting 
therefrom.34 
Wielding of the rate-foong power to correct displacement of 
northern coal in the Lake Cargo market was not, he de-
clared in echoing McClintic, a regulation of rates, but rather 
a regulation of "industrial conditions under the guise of 
regulating rates." The Commission had considered produc-
tion and employment as well as transportation in "an effort 
to equalize industrial conditions or offset economic advan-
tages [of the South]. "35 
In reaching its rate decision, the Lec had relied on the 
1925 Hoch-Smith Resolution, a farm relief measure, which 
authorized the agency to adjust rates in order to correct 
those found "unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory, 
or unduly preferential, thereby imposing undue burdens, or 
giving undue advantage as between the various localities and 
parts of the country. "36 Parker held in the Lake Cargo Coal 
Rate case, the federal judiciary's first interpretation of the 
resolution, that the statutory language constituted "no more 
than a general declaration that freight rates shall be adjusted 
in such a way as to provide the country with an adequate 
system of transportation." Surely Congress had never in-
tended "by this language to create in the Commission an 
economic dictatorship over the various sections of the coun-
try, with power to kill or make alive." Today, the Lee 
took aim at southern coal. Tomorrow, he warned, its target 
could be "cotton manufacturing, ... fruit growing, ... furni-
ture manufacturing, in short, ... every branch ofindustry."37 
If the Lee had exceeded its rate-fixing powers, could 
Congress remedy the deficiency by empowering the regula-
tory agency to weigh intersectional economic conditions in 
setting rail tariffs? Probably not. In an obiter-dictum, Parker 
invoked the Supreme Court's regionally beneficial decision 
in Hammer v. Dagenhart,38 a case that had arisen out of the 
North Carolina textile industry. The decade-old precedent 
The violent and emotion-laden labor con-
flict in the bituminous coal fields of south-
ern West Virginia, dramatized for modern 
movie audiences by director John Sayles 
in his 1987 pro-unionfilm "Matewan, " 
reached the Fourth Circuit court sixty 
years earlier. 
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A northbound Norfolk and Western freight in the "Lake Cargo" trade, hauling bituminous coal from mines in southern West Virginia, 
steams near Circleville, Ohio, thirty miles south of Columbus, on October 5, 1933. 
The violent and emotion-
laden labor conflict in the 
bituminous coal fields of 
southern West Virginia, 
dramatized for modern 
movie audiences by director 
John Sayles in his 1987 pro-
union film "Matewan,"43 
reached the Fourth Circuit 
court sixty years earlier. The 
primary issue in United 
Mine Workers of America v. 
Red Jacket Consolidated Coal 
and Coke Co. involved appli-
cation of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act to John L. Lewis' 
union then seeking to orga-
nize the West Virginia min-
ers.44 The Act's application 
hinged, in turn, on discovery 
solidly supported his contention that Congress "could not 
give the Commission power to fix rates to equalize industrial 
conditions." Regulation of production lay within the police 
powers of the states, a power reserved to them by the Tenth 
Amendment. Futhermore, Parker suggested, but did not 
decide, that such a rate-fixing basis likely violated the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment in that the rates pro-
mulgated would necessarily be "unreasonable and constitute 
an unprecedented interference with the industrial condi-
tions of the country."39 Dixie's hardpressed coal industry 
would be especially disadvantaged by the national regulatory 
agency's rate-making policies. 
Red Jacket. New South industries seemingly needed 
protection not only from unfavorable freight rates set by the 
Lee, but also from the imposition of national labor stan-
dards. As an isolated and low wage labor market, the South 
enjoyed a competitive edge in common markets against 
products from regions with higher labor costs and/or more 
capital intensive industries.40 Standardized national wages 
and working conditions threatened this regional advantage, 
thereby inflicting economic losses on both southern produc-
ers and their labor forces.41 The United Mine Workers of 
America (UMWA), in its quest for monopoly control over 
the price of all coal mine labor, posed just such a threat to 
regional economic development. Without judicial interven-
tion to foil unionization, an advocate for the southern op-
erators predicted, "the Union will succeed in the end in 
forcing ... non-union mined coal of West Virginia out of 
competition in the markets of the country with the coal 
produced by Union operators and miners under Union 
rules and regulations and sold at prices determined by the 
Union. "42 
of a relationship between the UMWA's organizational strat-
egies and interstate commerce. 
Resolution of the jurisdictional question reflected 
Parker's fideliry to judicial nationalism. He acknowledged 
Chief Justice Taft's holding in the First Coronado case 
wherein Taft declared "that coal mining is not commerce, 
and that ordinarily interference with coal mining could not 
be said to be interference with interstate commerce." But 
Parker entertained "no doubt that ... interference with coal 
mining did interfere with interstate commerce in coal as a 
natural and logical consequence."45 The Taft Court had said 
as much in its Second Coronado decision.46 The rule of that 
case, not that of First Coronado, applied to Red Jacket be-
cause the union, by calling a strike in order to organize the 
bituminous coal fields of West Virginia, surely "intended to 
interfere with the shipment of coal in interstate commerce" 
even in the absence of any evidence of interference with the 
actual transportation of coal. 47 
The facts spoke for themselves. The 316 coal companies 
joined as parries in the RedJacketcase produced 40,000,000 
tons a year, over ninery percent of which went into inter-
state commerce. "Interference with the production of these 
mines," he reasoned, "would necessarily interfere with inter-
state commerce in coal to a substantial degree. " This result 
suggested a conspiratorial intent, within the scope of the 
Act, to prevent interstate shipments of southern coal. "It 
was only as the coal entered into interstate commerce," 
Parker noted, "that it became a factor in the price and af-
fected defendants in their wage negotiations with the union 
operators. And in time of strike, it was only as it moved in 
interstate commerce that it relieved the coal scarcity and in-
terfered with the strike. "48 
Once Parker's broad conception of national commerce 
power had brought the UMWA's local organizing activities 
within the co un's federal question jurisdiction, he consid-
ered the scope of freedom to be accorded the union in its 
efforts to penetrate and organize the West Virginia coal 
miners employed under anti-union "yellow dog" contracts.49 
Resolution of this issue depended on the nature of the 
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Routes of the intersectional "Lake Cargo" bituminous coal trade from southern West 
Virginia to Lake Erie ports via the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co .. Hocking Valley 
Railway (consolidated with C. & O. Ry. in 1930). and the Norfolkand Western Railway 
Co. as well as the C. & O. and N. & W. rail link with Chicago. 
union and on Supreme Court precedents. The UMW A, 
headquartered in Indianapolis in the midst of the Central 
Competitive Field, clearly acted as a remote third party in-
terloper whenever its organizers appeared in West Virginia. 
Thus Parker correctly regarded the conflict not as one be-
rween that state's coal operators "and their [non-union] em-
ployees over wages, hours of labor, and other causes, but 
[one] ... berween them as non-union operators and the inter-
national union which is seeking to unionize their mines. "50 
Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchel~ 5 1 a case origin-
ating in the Fourth Circuit and decided by the High Court 
in 1917, together with that circuit's 1926 decision in Bittner 
v. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal CO. 52 controlled the extent 
of permissible strategies available to unions such as the 
UMW A Both precedents advanced injunctions as remedies 
for protecting non-union or "yellow dog" contracts under 
the constitutionally based "liberty of contract" doctrine pre-
viously approved by the Supreme Court in Adair v. United 
States and Coppage v. Kansas.53 Language of the Hitchman 
decree had pervaded the Bittner opinion authored by 
Parker's senior colleague, Edmund Waddill, Jr., as well as 
the trial court's rendition of RedJacket.54 
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Hitchman barred union organizers from peacefully per-
suading workers under "yellow dog" contracts to break their 
contracts by joining the union while remaining in their 
employer's work force. It also prevented union agents from 
merely persuading employees to join up and, honoring their 
contracts, leave their employment in order to strike. This 
anti-enticement provision was augmented by another pre-
venting persuasion of "any of plaintiffs employees to refuse 
or fail to perform their duties as such."55 Hitchman and its 
progeny, including Bittner, effectively walled off non-union 
workers in the southern bituminous fields from the blan-
dishments of national union organizers. 
UMW A effortS to distinguish Hitchman by confining its 
prohibitions to union-organizing strategies involving vio-
lence, fraud and/or deceit, factors present in Hitchman but 
not in Red Jacket, foundered on the sweeping language of 
the Hitchman decree which restrained even "peaceful per-
suasion."56 Nor did section 20 of the 1914 Clayton Act ap-
plyY That section prohibited issuance of injunctions against 
nonviolent persuasion tactics used by unions. Duplex Print-
ing Press Co. v. Deering had made clear, however, that this 
statutory restraint on federal judicial power applied only to 
conflicts berween an employer and his own employees or 
prospective employees. 58 It did not protect a remote third 
party union's peaceful intervention on behalf of the em-
ployer's workers and all other similarly situated employees. 
Chief Justice T afr there afrer modified Duplex in American 
Steel Foundries v. T ri-City Central Trades Council to permit 
peaceful persuasion when the union involved was a geo-
graphically local one. 59 
The UMW A fit within neither the Duplex nor T ri-City 
interpretation of the Clayton Act's protective shield. With a 
membership generously pegged by Parker at 475,000 and 
with local aifliiates spanning the North American continent, 
the union bore precious little resemblance to the geographi-
cally confined Tri-City Central Trades Council composed 
of thirty-seven crafr unions in a cluster of three Illinois 
Once Parker's broad conception of 
national commerce power had brought 
the Wl1WA 's local organizing activities 
within the court's federal question juris-
diction, he considered the scope of free-
dom to be accorded the union in its efforts 
to penetrate and organize the West Vir-
ginia coal miners employed under anti-
union "yellow dog " contracts. 
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He held that union agents might peace-
fidly persuade non-union employees to 
leave their employment and join the union 
in order to go on strike and to refrain 
from entering the employee's workplace 
during a strike against it. 
towns. 6O And the UMW A's goals were different too. It 
sought not standardization of wages and working conditions 
in a confined locality, but their standardization on a na-
tional industry-wide basis.61 
1m pelled by advice received from dying colleague John 
C. Rose and by his own latent sympathy for working men 
and women which had emerged in political appeals made in 
the 1920 gubernatorial campaign as well as in judicial opin-
ions, Parker limited the Hitchman doctrine.62 He held that 
union agents might peacefully persuade non-union employ-
ees to leave their employment and join the union in order to 
go on strike and to refrain from entering the employee's 
workplace during a strike against it. What the Union could 
not do was, 
to approach a company's employees, working under a 
contract not to join the union while remaining in the 
company's service, and induce them, in violation of 
their contracts, to join the union and go on strike for 
the purpose of forcing the company to recognize the 
union or of impairing its power of production. 63 
"Hitchman," Parker declared, "is conclusive of the point in-
volved here." But the sole "point involved" was actual or 
attempted contract-breaking, an unlawful act which only 
occurred when an employee joined the union while remain-
ing in the employer's workforce. RedJacket's decree, as he 
stated, was "certainly not so broad as that of the decree ap-
proved by the Supreme Court in Hitchman Coal and Coke 
Co. v. Mitchell . .. which also enjoined [any] interference with 
the contract by means of peaceful persuasion."64 
Red Jacket reflected a cautious balancing of the compet-
ing interests of a nationwide labor union and a regional in-
dustry within the rigid confines of the labor law current at 
the time.65 Parker weighed organized labor's interest in com-
municating its message to non-union miners, recruiting 
them into union ranks, organizing the mines, thereafter de-
veloping a collective bargaining relationship conducive to 
improved standardized wages and working conditions for 
individual southern coal miners. At the same time, he took 
account of the interests of the bituminous operators. Their 
regionally important production and employment capabili-
ties depended on offering their soft coal at marginally lower 
market prices which, in turn, rested partially on wage scales 
remaining below uniform industry-wide scales prescribed by 
the UMW A and on the enforcement of "yellow-dog" con-
tracts as a defense against injurious strikes intended to pro-
mote the union's goals. 
Appalachian Coals, Inc. Notwithstanding protection 
accorded the faltering soft coal industry by the Lake Cargo 
and Red Jacket decisions, conditions in the southern 
coalfields went from bad to worse as the Great Depression 
began. Shrinking markets, sinking prices, and demoraliza-
tion of an ever smaller labor force caused desperate operators 
in Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee to es-
tablish a sales cartel early in 1932. Appalachian Coals, Inc. 
consisted of 137 producers who, in 1929, mined fifty-four 
percent of all bituminous extracted in the southern fields 
and twelve percent of total soft coal produced east of the 
Mississippi River. Their sales predominated in competitive 
markets from the Carolinas and Georgia westward to Indi-
ana, southern Michigan, and the Great Lakes region. Once 
the cartel had been created, the Department of] ustice acted 
to enjoin the agency's operations under the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act.66 
Following hearings on United States v. Appalachian Coals, 
Inc. before a three-judge district court wholly composed of 
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cartel's capacity for success in stabilizing coal pricesY Yet, 
he "started into the case with the feeling that the combin-
ation ought to be upheld and that it could be upheld under 
the decisions in the Steel and Harvester cases, "68 The associa-
tion, he reasoned, had "been acting fairly and openly, in an 
attempt to organize the coal industry and to relieve the de-
plorable conditions resulting from over-expansion, destruc-
tive competition, wasteful trade practices, and the inroads of 
competing industries,"69 
However justifiable the combination, hopes for eluding 
the Anri-Trust Act were soon dashed by close examination 
of Supreme Court precedents and of the decision in United 
States v, American Can Co. handed down by his late appeals 
court colleague, Judge John C. Rose.70 The then federal dis-
trict judge in Maryland used the Supreme Court's "rule of 
reason" standard to distinguish monopolies arising out of 
natural and legitimate business expansion from those caused 
by unnatural and illegitimate acquisitions intended to re-
Parker adjudicated appeals that enabled 
him to help shape economic life from 
West Virginia and Maryland to South 
Carolina and from the Appalachians to 
the Atlantic. 
strain interstate trade or to create monopolies,?1 Appalachian 
Coals Inc. clearly fell into the latter category. Agency mem-
bers, independent coal operators who together controlled "a 
substantial part of the trade," had agreed to fix uniform sell-
ing prices in order to eliminate competition among them-
selves. Such an agreement suggested a plan to fix monopoly 
prices in consuming markets "forbidden by the Sherman 
Act."72 
Parker regretted the conclusion. "We sympathize with 
the plight of those engaged in the coal industry, whether as 
operators or as miners," he wrote, "but we have no option 
but to declare the law as we find it. We cannot repeal acts of 
Congress nor can we overrule decisions of the Supreme 
Court interpreting them." Quite possibly a cooperative coal 
marketing agency offered the sole hope for relieving the 
industry's economic distress. That remedy, however, was 
one "which addresses itself to the lawmaking branch of the 
government. "73 
The Supreme Court, not Congress, soon acted to protect 
a major regional industry. A week prior to Franklin 
Roosevelt's first inauguration, ChiefJustice Hughes held 
that an unreasonable restraint of trade did not arise from 
mere establishment of a cooperative enterprise which af-
fected market conditions, especially when that combination 
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Parker's constitutional jurisprudence 
developed from 1925 to 1933 was a defen-
sive jUrisprudence endowed with a high, if 
rarely articulated, policy content. 
had a laudable purpose and, as Parker had shown, no capac-
ity for becoming a monopolistic menace. The Court took 
cognizance of the reality that "when industry is grievously 
hurt, when producing concerns fail, when unemployment 
mounts and communities dependent upon profitable pro-
duction are prostrated, the wells of commerce go dry. "74 
The Sherman Act did not mandate that outcome. 
Reversal by the High Court both bemused and pleased 
Parker. The Court had reached its conclusion, he noted, by 
overruling "some of its former decisions, which, of course, 
that Court has a right to do." That its policy-actuated hold-
ing overturned his own opinion did not make him "feel at 
all bad for I think that I would have decided the case exactly 
as the Supreme Court did if! had not felt bound by its 
former decisions."75 
Conclusion 
John]. Parker's performance, especially in cases involv-
ing important questions of southern regional economic de-
velopment, spawned a "New South" constitutional jurispru-
dence that required a delicate balancing of national and re-
gional interests. He was constrained by the abilities of ag-
grieved parties to litigate and appeal, by the reach of federal 
jurisdiction, by existing judicial precedents, and by the cir-
cumscribed position of a judge on a intermediate appellate 
court. Nevertheless, Parker adjudicated appeals that enabled 
him to help shape economic life from West Virginia and 
Maryland to South Carolina and from the Appalachians to 
the Atlantic. 
Conflicts between state and national powers or between 
regional entrepreneurs and national regulations detrimental 
Emerging in the twilight of an expiring 
economic order, this sometimes national 
and sometimes regional constitutionalism 
was marked by a combination of realism 
and optimism, by a sober reflection on the 
painfUl economic plight of the region, and 
by eternal optimism about the future of 
the South 's human and natural resources. 
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to southern economic interests tested the judge. Aware that 
the South stood outside the nation's economic mainstream, 
Parker labored to clothe such regional interests with judicial 
protection. But he evaluated national regulations in terms of 
specific economic costs and benefits which the region de-
rived from them. Ulterior motives associated with preserva-
tion of the racial status quo did not figure in his assessments. 
In fact, his lone pre-nomination judicial opinion which 
spoke directly to the race question actually threatened the 
racial status quo at its most sensitive points, intermarriage 
and residential living parterns?6 
The financially pressed southern bituminous coal indus-
try received his special solicitude. Elements of dual federal-
ism and Marshallian nationalism combined in his adjudica-
tion of these coal cases to produce a pragmatic, policy-ori-
ented, and regionally biased southern constitutional juris-
prudence as proffered in the Lake Cargo case and as realized 
in the controversial Red Jacket decision. The larter invoked a 
broad nationalistic conception of the commerce power com-
bined with a balanced consideration of union-operator rela-
tionships then controlled by a series of Supreme Court deci-
sions based on the "liberty of contract" doctrine. Although 
favorable to the operators, his RedJacketdecision necessarily 
protected the jobs of southern miners while at the same time 
according some union access to employees working under 
"yellow-dog" contracts. 
Parker's constitutional jurisprudence developed from 
1925 to 1933 was a defensive jurisprudence endowed with a 
high, if rarely articulated, policy content. Emerging in the 
twilight of an expiring economic order, this sometimes na-
tional and sometimes regional constitutionalism was marked 
by a combination of realism and optimism, by a sober re-
flection on the painful economic plight of the region, and 
by eternal optimism about the future of the South's human 
and natural resources. Neither these considerations nor their 
policy consequences could have been received with equa-
nimity by his critics who espoused the interests of rival geo-
graphic sections.77 A pall of silence enveloped this eminently 
rational, albeit politically untenable, grounds for opposing 
elevation of a "New South" jurist to the Supreme Court. Far 
more simple and effective was it in 1930 to assail Judge 
Parker as a "white supremacist" and sworn enemy of labor. 
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